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Summary 
 This paper analyses some of the theoretical and empirical argu-
ments that serve to legitimate regional policies in Europe. We start by 
reviewing the existing evidence that European integration has led to a 
process of convergence between countries but not between regions 
inside countries and suggest some mechanisms through which this 
can happen. Taking the example of France, we show that in the past 
twenty years regional divergence in production has indeed occurred. 
However, the geography of incomes has, during the same period, be-
come more equal producing a “scissors effect” between the geogra-
phies of production and income. This suggests that transfers, which 
have nothing to do with regional policies, have, at least in France, 
more than compensated the increase in production inequality. Hence, 
“regional convergence” is not a synonym of “regional cohesion” at 
least at the national level. 
We then review evidence on a possible trade-off between growth 
and regional inequalities to suggest that efficiency motives can not 
easily be used to defend regional policies. Both evidence and theory 
suggest that regional concentration leads to efficiency gains. This also 
implies that the EU is faced with a choice it has tried to avoid until 
now. Either, it puts its effort in slowing or even reversing the process 
of spatial economic concentration at the national level or it concen-
trates on policies to speed up the convergence process between poor 
and rich countries. Finally, we analyse the relation between spatial and 
social inequalities. We report empirical evidence for Europe that sug-
gests a strong empirical relation between the two: even after control-
ling for transfers and other possible determinants of individual ine-
qualities, we find that countries with more regional inequalities are 
also those with more individual inequalities.  
JEL classification: H2, H7 and R0. 
Key words: Economic geography, regional inequalities and regional 
subsidies.
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The concern for cohesion is an important feature of the process of 
European integration. While the Single Market offered the promise of 
increased output and efficiency for the EU as a whole, it is often ar-
gued that the viability of the project, in social and political terms, re-
quires that the gains are fairly distributed across countries and regions. 
This has led to a large increase in funds for regional policies and an 
explicit mention of the objective of reducing regional disparities in the 
Single European Act (Article 1). The EU has been devoting an in-
creasing share of its budget to regional policies. The Structural Funds 
and the Cohesion Fund represent over one third of the 2004 Com-
munity budget.  
At the European level, the goal of the cohesion policy is not 
precisely defined: it can broadly be interpreted as to reduce the wel-
fare differences among European regions. Article 158 of the amended 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) establishing the European Community 
reads:  
“...the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of devel-
opment of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured re-
gions or islands, including rural areas”.  
 
This is broad because it could be interpreted as reducing inequalities 
between countries or between regions inside countries. Moreover, 
regional policies are often presented by policy makers as part of a 
broader objective to reduce inequalities between the poor and the 
rich. Regional cohesion is seen as a prerequisite for social cohesion 
and this is the main reason why regional inequalities should be re-
duced. There is an implicit assumption here: that the spatial dimen-
sion of inequalities is an important determinant of inequalities be-
tween individuals at the national level. This is an important assump-
tion, because it implies that social transfers that are not spatially de-
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fined (unemployment benefits, national income taxes, social security 
transfers etc.) are not enough to ensure social cohesion at the national 
level.  
In this paper, we argue that regional policies, as they exist today in 
Europe, are based on shaky grounds both from an empirical and 
theoretical point of view. We start by reviewing the existing evidence 
that European integration has led to a process of convergence be-
tween countries, but not between regions inside countries. Some 
mechanisms are suggested through which trade integration in Europe 
can lead to a process of convergence between countries but not be-
tween regions inside countries. This will in particular be the case if, 
due to European structural and institutional features, poor regions 
cannot exploit their comparative advantage relative to rich regions as 
well as poor countries can exploit their comparative advantage relative 
to rich countries. Taking the example of France, we show that in the 
past twenty years, regional divergence in production has indeed oc-
curred. However, the geography of incomes has, during the same pe-
riod, become more equal, thereby producing a “scissors effect” be-
tween the geographies of production and income. This suggests that 
transfers, which have no relation to regional policies, have, at least in 
France, more than compensated for the increase in production ine-
quality. Hence, “regional convergence” is not a synonym of “regional 
cohesion”, at least not at the national level.  
We then review evidence on a possible trade-off between growth 
and regional inequalities to suggest that efficiency motives can not 
easily be used to defend regional policies. Both evidence and theory 
suggest that regional concentration leads to efficiency gains, so that 
regional policies attempting to reduce such spatial concentration can-
not be based on strong efficiency grounds. This also implies that the 
EU is faced with a choice it has tried to avoid until now. Either, it 
puts its effort into slowing or even reversing the process of spatial 
economic concentration at the national level, or it concentrates on 
policies to speed up the convergence process between poor and rich 
countries. Finally, we analyse the relation between spatial and social 
inequalities. We report empirical evidence that suggests a strong em-
pirical relation between the two in the EU. 
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1. Regional convergence and divergence in Europe 
1.1. Global convergence and local divergence 
Spatial inequalities have developed among the European countries 
and among the countries’ own internal regions in different ways. Ta-
ble 1 below illustrates the development of those disparities measured 
by the standard per capita GDP deviation for the NUTS2 regions for 
the year 1990 and the period 1995-2000. In eight countries, internal 
regional disparities have increased since 1995. The last two lines of 
the table also show that while inequalities among countries dimin-
ished, those among the countries’ own internal regions on average 
increased somewhat. The data also suggests that disparities increased 
especially in countries with initially low disparities and decreased in 
those countries with initially high disparities.  
Detailed studies have shown (Duro, 2001) that up to the mid-
eighties, GDP per capita inequalities among member states repre-
sented half the inequalities among the European regions, and ine-
qualities among regions within each state represented the other half. 
Since then, inequalities among states have diminished by 25 percent, 
but regional inequalities within states have increased by 10 percent. As 
a result, regional inequalities in Europe are mainly explained by ine-
qualities within countries. Thus, Europe is experiencing a process of 
convergence among countries at the same time as a process of non 
convergence or divergence among the countries’ own regions: all 
convergence among regions in Europe at the European level is thus 
explained by the convergence among countries.  
Further evidence on the subject is given by Midelfart-Knarvik and 
Overman (2002). Figure 1 shows the coefficient of variation (the 
standard deviation divided by the mean) for the distribution of manu-
facturing activity across states and regions in the EU. At the national 
level, this index of geographical concentration remains roughly con-
stant over time. However, at the regional level geographical concen-
tration is more pronounced and has been increasing over time. 
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Table 1. Regional disparities in per capita GDP within the 
member States, 1990-2000.  
NUTS2 (Standard deviation of index EU15=100) 
Member State 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Belgium .. 40.8 41.6 41.6 41.6 40.2 39.4 
Germanya) 21.8 20.1 20.5 20.9 21.0 21.5 22.1 
Greece 6.3 10.4 10.3 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.6 
Spain 14.9 16.8 17.1 17.4 17.4 18.1 18.1 
France 28.9 28.2 27.9 27.3 26.6 27.5 28.3 
Italy 24.8 28.5 28.9 27.7 28.1 27.8 27.2 
Netherlands 10.6 13.5 14.6 15.3 15.7 15.8 15.5 
Austria 27.5 25.4 24.8 23.6 22.7 22.5 23.9 
Portugal 13.5 15.2 15.4 17.3 17.9 17.6 16.6 
Finland 17.9 19.5 21.2 20.8 23.9 24.2 25.0 
Sweden 10.9 12.0 13.0 15.2 16.3 20.1 20.9 
GB 20.2 31.5 32.0 34.0 35.6 34.2 34.2 
EU15 (by  
member state) 
12.5 12.5 11.8 11.6 11.7 11.0 11.4 
EU15 (within 
member states) 
26.5 28.3 28.1 28.2 28.5 28.2 28.5 
Source: European Commission (2002). a) Excl. New Länder. 
 
Figure 1. Geographical concentration of economic activity  
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Source: Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002). 
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At the EU level, a similar development in spatial polarization may 
be described for unemployment. Overman and Puga (2002) show that 
since the mid-eighties, regions starting out with a low or high unem-
ployment rate have not shown much change in their relative situation. 
Regions with intermediate unemployment rates, on the other hand, 
have developed toward extremes. The authors interpret this result as 
an effect of the spatial polarization of economic activities due to eco-
nomic integration. They show that the fate of  regions in terms of un-
employment is much more closely linked to the results of 
neighbouring regions (whether or not they belong to the same coun-
try) than to that of the respective country itself.  
To sum up, trade integration in Europe has helped convergence 
between countries. However, it has not fostered convergence between 
regions inside countries. In some cases, regional disparities have in-
creased. Spatial polarization has occurred both in terms of income 
and unemployment.  
1.2. The geographies of production and income diverge:  
The French case 
However, this picture is misleading if it leads to the conclusion 
that social inequalities have increased between regions inside Europe. 
A contradictory image may emerge if one looks at regional inequalities 
of disposable income, i.e., income net of transfers. Here, we only look 
at the French example. For French regions, the difference is quite 
striking. Figure 2 shows the coefficient of variation across French 
NUTS2 regions from 1982 to 2002. There is a clear upwards trend of 
regional inequalities in production during the period.  
Figure 3 gives the same measure of regional inequalities for the 
unemployment rate from 1981 to 2004. In the 1980’s up to the 
1990’s, regional inequalities also increased. However, and quite sur-
prisingly, recent years show a very dramatic decrease in this measure 
of inequality. It is known that regional inequalities in unemployment 
are countercyclical (high unemployment regions have more stable un-
employment rates than low unemployment regions), so that the latest 
drop is partly cyclical and reflects the recent increase in unemploy-
ment in France. 
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Figure 2. Coefficient of variation French NUTS2 regions  
(GDP per capita 1982-2002) 
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Figure 3. Coefficient of variation: Unemployment  
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Source: Insee. 
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Figure 4 gives a very different picture. It shows the coefficient of 
variation of disposable income for NUTS2 regions from 1982 to 1999 
(later data is not available). First, and not surprisingly, the inequality is 
less for disposable income per capita than for GDP per capita. On 
average, the regional inequality in GDP per capita is more than dou-
ble the inequality in disposable income. More surprisingly, even 
though the first measure increased by more than 2 percentage points, 
the second measure actually decreased by 2 percentage points. As 
stressed by Davezies (2001), there is a growing disconnect between 
the geography of production (becoming more unequal) and the geog-
raphy of incomes (becoming more equal) so that “regional conver-
gence” is not a synonym of “regional cohesion”. The reason for this 
is that inter-regional income transfers are important even though 
nothing much is known about them. In particular, it is difficult to 
quantify the impact of public versus private transfers in the difference 
between GDP and income at the regional level.  
Figure 4. Coefficient of variation French NUTS2 regions (Dis-
posable income per capita 1982-1999) 
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Source: Insee. 
 
This French disconnect between the geography of production and 
the geography of income is not a general phenomenon, however. Un-
fortunately, we do not have data for other countries to draw general 
conclusions. There is, however, evidence (see Monastiriotis, 2003) 
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that in the UK, both types of regional inequalities (in terms of GDP 
per capita and in terms of disposable income) have increased in the 
past twenty years. This suggests that the evolution of the welfare state 
is key. Whereas in France, during the past twenty years, transfers (due 
to the progressivity of the income tax, social security, unemployment 
benefits etc.) have increased, this has not been the case in the UK. 
The important point is that regional policies certainly do not explain 
much of the difference between UK and France. In France, national 
regional policies that attempt to give incentives (essentially through 
tax cuts) for firms to locate in the poorest regions (the “politique 
d’aménagement du territoire”) are very active, although it is difficult 
to evaluate their real impact, in part because the government does not 
provide much data. In the UK, on the other hand, these policies are 
much less important. This suggests that interregional transfers are 
very large and growing in France. It also suggests that they are mostly 
due to progressive income taxes and the welfare state, not to spatially 
defined policies such as regional policies. 
2. A tentative explanation for global convergence and 
local divergence 
The presence of economies of scale and trade costs may explain why 
regions with no obvious comparative advantage in certain activities 
can become centres of production of those activities. A model of the 
underlying mechanisms was introduced by Krugman (1991), who was 
at the origin of the so-called “new economic geography” (see also the 
paper by Baldwin, 2005, in this issue). The central finding of this lit-
erature is that the reduction of trade costs may engender a concentra-
tion of economic activities in certain regions that have better access to 
the large markets, even if they do not have the lowest production 
costs. This spatial concentration is advantageous because of the exis-
tence of economies of scale conducive to limiting production loca-
tions, and it is made possible by trade integration which, while reduc-
ing transaction costs, does not oblige enterprises to be located close 
to all their consumers. 
Here, we simply want to very briefly analyse what are some of the 
necessary conditions for a process of “local divergence” with “global 
convergence” to follow trade integration.1 The interaction of econo-
 
1 In the context of the footloose capital model, Andres (2004) shows a similar result 
in a general equilibrium framework. 
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mies of scale, comparative advantage and trade costs is essential. The 
purpose of the small “model” we provide here is simply to illustrate a 
mechanism which we believe may be more general. Suppose there are 
three regions. The first, which, for illustrative purposes, we call the 
Ruhr, is a rich and central region with high wages and hence, high 
labour costs. The second region, which we call Catalonia, is a middle-
income region close to the large European markets. A third region, 
Andalusia, is a peripheral region with low wages and hence, low la-
bour costs. Economies of scale play a major role in the sense that av-
erage production costs increase with the number of locations due to 
fixed costs. Let us assume that the firm can produce in the three re-
gions, or in one only.2 The choice of location is simply a minimization 
of the sum of production and trade costs.  
If the firm decides to produce in the three regions, its total cost is: 
 
TC(R C A) 3F c S c S c SR R C C A+ + = + + + A , 
 
where F is the fixed cost associated with each plant, cR, cC , cA are the 
marginal costs of production (that can be interpreted as the wage 
costs) in the Ruhr, Catalonia and Andalusia, respectively. We assume 
that cR > cC > cA . SR , SC , SA are the market sizes in the Ruhr, Catalo-
nia and Andalusia, respectively. However, we assume that SR > SC > 
SA . Note that in this situation, the firm pays no trade or transport 
costs as it produces in all three locations. 
If the firm produces in the Ruhr only, its total cost is: 
 
TC R F c S S S t S S t SR R C A I C A D A( ) ( ) ( )= + + + + + + , 
 
where tI is the international trade cost which the firm located in Ger-
many has to pay to sell in Catalonia and Andalusia. To sell in Andalu-
sia, the firm also has to pay the domestic Spanish trade cost (which 
can be interpreted as a transport cost) as this region is in the periph-
ery.  
If the firm produces in Catalonia only, its total cost is:  
 
TC C F c S S S t S t SC R C A I R D A( ) ( )= + + + + + , 
 
 
2 The firm could, of course, produce in two regions. This possibility would compli-
cate the presentation without adding much. 
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so that it pays the international trade cost to sell in Germany and the 
domestic Spanish cost to sell in Andalusia. 
Finally, if the firm decides to produce in Andalusia, its total cost is: 
 
TC A F c S S S t t S t SA R C A I D R D C( ) ( )= + + + + + +b g . 
 
Suppose we start from a situation where international trade costs tI are 
very high. In this situation, which we interpret as the pattern before 
the European integration process, the firm will want to locate some 
activity in the three locations. It is easy to check and it is intuitive in-
deed that if tI is high enough (and domestic transport costs are not 
too low either), then: TC R C A TC R TC C TC A( ) ( ), ( ) ( )+ + < ,  and 
any other location equilibrium. This just says that if trade costs are 
high, firms will want to be close to all their consumers.  
Suppose now that Spain and Germany lower their trade costs, tI. In 
a highly stylized way, we interpret the scenario of “global convergence 
with local divergence” as a case when the firm chooses to locate in 
Catalonia only. In this case, Spain as a whole gains some economic 
activity but Andalusia loses it. 
This will be the case under the following conditions:  
 
1
3
) ( ) ( );
( ) ( );
) ( ) ( ).
TC R C A TC C
TC R TC C
TC A TC C
+ + >
>
>
2) 
 
 
 
It can be checked that condition 1) is fulfilled when fixed costs are 
sufficiently high, international and domestic trade costs are suffi-
ciently low, the international cost advantage of Spain over Germany is 
sufficiently high but the cost disadvantage of Catalonia is relatively 
small compared to Andalusia. Condition 2) applies for some of the 
same characteristics as 1) but also requires that the overall Spanish 
market is not too small compared to the German market. Finally, 
condition 3) requires, on top of some of the characteristics above, 
that the domestic cost in Spain is not too small. 
Figure 5 below shows an example of some possible outcomes of 
locations depending on combinations of international trade costs tI 
and national cost differences between the two Spanish regions, cC - cA. 
It illustrates that the scenario of global convergence and local diver-
gence (going from location pattern R+C+A to the location in C only) 
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is possible when international trade costs are lowered and the differ-
ence in production costs between C and A is low enough. 
Figure 5. The possibility of global convergence and local di-
vergence following European trade integration 
 
 
Overall, this example suggests that international integration (lower 
tI) can lead to global convergence and local divergence, if the interna-
tional cost advantage of the poorer country is larger than the national 
cost advantage of the poorer region. One might think that the Euro-
pean practice of nationally uniform minimum wages (and more gen-
erally of labour institutions) coupled with different labour costs be-
tween countries can produce exactly such a situation. The example 
also suggests that such a scenario will occur in countries for which the 
richest region has both a large domestic market and good market ac-
cess to other rich regions. In this case, market access is the main driv-
ing force of location between regions inside countries and differences 
in the cost of production are the main driving forces of location be-
tween countries. 
Lower domestic transport costs in Spain, for example due to infra-
structure projects financed by Structural Funds, may not produce lo-
cal convergence. This has, for example, been shown in Martin and 
Rogers (1995). In this example, it can be checked that when domestic 
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trade costs are high, the firm prefers to locate production in both 
Spanish regions, in order to serve the local market. At intermediate 
levels, the firm will prefer to concentrate its production in the richest 
of the two regions and save on transport costs. At low levels of trans-
port cost, the difference in production costs becomes the most im-
portant factor determining the firm’s choice of location, which pre-
sumably favours the poorest region. Note, however, that if, again for 
institutional reasons, differences in production costs between regions 
inside countries are constrained to be small, then regional policies that 
build transport infrastructures between rich and poor regions will 
only emphasize the market size differences between those regions. 
Overall, this analytical framework suggests quite intuitively that the 
interaction of economies of scale and trade costs may produce a sce-
nario of global convergence with local divergence following trade in-
tegration if poor countriesbut not, or to a lesser extent, poor re-
gionscan take advantage of their “natural” comparative advantage. 
Note also that this same mechanism that leads to the global conver-
gence/local divergence phenomenon can also explain why regional 
policies emphasizing transport infrastructure may not be successful in 
decreasing inequalities between poor and rich regions (see Martin, 
2003, for a review of the evidence on the effects of regional policies 
in Europe).  
3. Regional policies and the possibility of a tradeoff be-
tween equity and efficiency 
A motivation for public intervention at the regional level, put forward 
by the Commission, is that of efficiency. In geographic disequilibria, it 
sees “an underutilization of economic and social potentials and an 
inability to take advantage of opportunities that could be beneficial to 
the Union as a whole”. 
This motivation is much less clear than the equity based motiva-
tion, to which we will return. If the phenomenon of spatial concentra-
tion is explained by the existence of economies of scale, this means 
that spatial agglomeration is at the origin of economic gains. This will 
be the case if firms can benefit from the proximity of other enter-
prises in the same sector to diminish their costs (transport costs or 
fixed costs). This will also be the case if such concentration makes it 
possible to increase the firms’ productivity through localised spillover 
effects, i.e. if the firms can receive transfers of knowledge from other 
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neighbouring businesses. These localised spillovers have been docu-
mented in numerous studies (see, for example, Jaffe et al., 1993) and 
the existence of agglomeration gains has been extensively discussed 
by economists since they were described by Marshall in 1890. The 
example of Silicon Valley shows the advantage a country can obtain 
from a very heavy spatial concentration of activities with positive 
technological externalities. The stronger spatial concentration of in-
novation-based activities in relation to production activities thus has 
an economic rationale, and the benefits of this spatial concentration 
go beyond private gains. Another gain from agglomeration, both for 
workers and firms, is labour pooling: firms benefit from a large spatial 
concentration of specialised workers in an area because they can easily 
hire from this large pool.  
The objective of policies promoting a greater dispersal of eco-
nomic activities is based on the assumption that the economic geog-
raphy produced by market forces alone is too concentrated. However, 
the efficiency argument may demand more or less spatial concentra-
tion: on the one hand, the economic gains of spatial agglomeration 
discussed above and, on the other, the effects of congestion (as, for 
example, reflected in pollution or the high price of fixed factors such 
as land). The fact that in Europe, the convergence of countries is ac-
companied by national divergence makes one think that the former 
type of argument, efficiency gains with spatial concentration, has 
pride of place. In this case, a tradeoff between equity and spatial effi-
ciency appears (see Martin 1999; and Baldwin et al., 2003). It is diffi-
cult to quantitatively assess this tradeoff. Figure 6 shows the relation 
between the levels of regional disparities and GDP per capita in the 
larger EU15 countries. Denmark, Ireland and Luxemburg are ex-
cluded because of lack of regional data for those small countries. Two 
groups appear clearly. The three poorest countries (Greece, Portugal 
and Spain) have the lowest level of regional disparities. The second 
group of countries, the relatively rich, have an average level of re-
gional disparities, which is clearly above the first group. However, no 
obvious relation appears inside this group. The positive relation be-
tween the overall country growth of GDP and the growth of regional 
disparities during the period 1994-2000 appears more clearly in Figure 
7.3 Naturally, this positive correlation should be taken with much cau-
 
3 The relation is given in log because it does not appear to be linear. 
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tion. It is suggestive of the possible existence of a tradeoff between 
spatial equity and growth, but such a correlation may not be causal. 
Other evidence is provided by Ciccone and Hall (1996) for the US 
and Ciccone (2002) for Europe. Both find that employment density 
has a positive effect on productivity levels. Recent econometric work 
by Crozet and Koenig (2005) gives a more precise picture of this 
tradeoff in Europe. They find a positive relation between the GDP 
per capita growth of a region and the change in the level of inequali-
ties inside the region. The effect is also economically significant: a 10 
per cent increase in the standard deviation index of GDP per capita 
within a NUTS1 region leads to a 1.6 per cent increase in regional 
GDP per capita. 
Figure 6. GDP/head and regional disparities (year 2000) 
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Figure 7. Growth and regional disparities (year 1995-2000) 
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The existence of such a tradeoff has consequences for the defini-
tion and quantification of objectives of regional policies, in particular 
in the case of the new entrants. It implies that a strategic choice has to 
be made between the objective of lowering or stabilising the absolute 
differences in GDP per capita between regions inside countries and 
the objective of fast convergence towards the rest of the EU. The de-
cisions of which infrastructure projects to finance and where to locate 
them are obviously dependent on this strategic choice between exter-
nal and internal convergence. In this matter, an interesting choice was 
made by Ireland which decided to be defined as a single NUTS2 re-
gion rather than as several small regions,  which would have implied a 
high degree of spatial inequality. As emphasized by Davezies (1999), it 
therefore took the risk of being more rapidly excluded from the bene-
fit of the Structural Funds, but it could choose to develop projects in 
those regions which provided the highest national return.  
To sum up, spatial agglomeration of economic activities may (at 
least up to a certain point where congestion effects may become too 
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large) have positive efficiency effects and may be a welcome conse-
quence of trade integration. This implies a trade-off for regional poli-
cies between efficiency and equity. 
4. Inequalities between regions and inequalities be-
tween individuals 
4.1. The equity motive behind regional policies  
Equity is the other traditional motivation for regional policies after 
efficiency. Certain economic agents, be they workers or consumers, 
are not mobile and are therefore condemned to live in poor or declin-
ing regions from which the mobile factors (capital and highly skilled 
workers) have departed. Because of the lower labour demand in such 
regions, real wages will adjust downward or, if real wages do not ad-
just because of labour market rigidities, unemployment will increase. 
In both cases, the welfare of the inhabitants will deteriorate. As con-
sumers, those agents will also see their welfare deteriorate since cer-
tain goods and services will no longer be produced locally (the busi-
nesses have left for more wealthy regions). In certain cases, in particu-
lar for certain services, the transaction costs will become so high that 
they can no longer be consumed by those agents. Thus, the diversity 
of consumable goods and services in the poor region will decline.  
Moreover, the most mobile agents are in general those with the 
highest level of human capital (education, experience etc.). Thanks to 
the possession of “positive externalities” in the form of localized so-
cial interactions, such agents have a positive impact on productivity 
and thus, on the real wages of other workers. By leaving a region in 
decline, the most productive workers thus also have a negative impact 
on the productivity of the remaining workers, i.e. those who are the 
most disadvantaged. There is thus an absence of market coordination, 
given that when certain agents decide on their location, they do not 
take into account the effect of their choice on other agents. From that 
standpoint, the possibility of a market failure, with the consequent 
increase in inequalities that is specific to the spatial dimension of the 
economy, exists and may thus serve as motivation for public interven-
tion.  
There are several ways to analyse the impact of the agglomeration 
phenomenon on the least mobile agents. The first would be to refuse 
to see it as a problem of equity, but to interpret it as coming from a 
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specific market failure. In Europe, except in the UK, promoting the 
spatial mobility of workers is not considered a solution to the prob-
lems of regional inequality. This is legitimate, but only partially so, 
since there will always be a substantial fringe of workers who will be 
harmed by geographic inequalities because of cultural and social ob-
stacles. The vision of regions empty both of inhabitants and 
economic activities (such as the Dakotas in the United States) is unac-
ceptable in Europe. 
4.2. Are spatial inequalities in production correlated to social 
inequalities? 
Policy makers often argue that a strong rationale for decreasing re-
gional inequalities is that it is part of the wider objective to decrease 
inequalities between individuals. Spatial cohesion is part of an overall 
objective of social cohesion. This is based on the belief that there is a 
strong relation between spatial inequalities and individual inequalities, 
so that regional policies that decrease spatial inequalities can also de-
crease individual inequalities.  
From a theoretical point of view, it is not obvious that countries 
which are spatially more unequal, are also those with a more unequal 
income distribution. The problem comes from aggregation, which is 
well known to those who have studied the dynamics of inequalities at 
the international level. 
Take a simple example of two countries, A and B, each of them 
comprised of two regions, 1 and 2, each with the same population of 
50 individuals. Both countries have the same average GDP and GDP 
per capita. Country A has no spatial inequality; its two regions have 
the same income per capita. However, in both regions, the distribu-
tion of income is highly unequal. Say that 10 per cent of the individu-
als each earn 10 and 90 per cent of the individuals each earn 1. So the 
overall inequality as measured by the percentage of total income that 
goes to the richest 10 per cent, is 100/190= 53 per cent. Hence, this 
is a very unequal society, even though there is no spatial inequality. 
The other country has a different distribution of total income. In re-
gion 1, 20 per cent of the population each earn 5.5 and 80 per cent 
1.5, so that the average income per capita in the region is 2.3. In the 
other region, all earn 1.5. Hence, spatial inequality is quite large in this 
case, as the income per capita in the rich region is more than 50 per 
cent larger than in the poor region. However, the distribution of in-
come at the country level is much less unequal than for country A: the 
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percentage of total income that goes to the richest 10 per cent of the 
population (all in the richest region) is 55/190= 29 per cent. 
This illustrative example shows that higher spatial inequality meas-
ured by differences in income per capita across regions does not 
automatically generate a more unequal distribution of income. More-
over, in our example, a spatially based redistributive policy would 
seem unfair to the “poor” of the rich region. An income transfer 
from region 1 to region 2, even if financed by the rich of the richest 
region, would artificially create an inequality between the “poor” of 
the rich region and those in the poor region. Such a transfer from the 
rich to the poor region would increase certain measures of income 
inequality. 
Hence, an obvious question is whether there is a relation between 
spatial and social inequalities. One way of checking whether such a 
relation exists is to regress a measure of interpersonal inequality 
(namely, the log of the ratio of the mean net income of the top decile 
to the bottom decile) on likely determinants of interpersonal inequal-
ity as well a measure of spatial inequality. Table 2 shows the results of 
such regressions for pooled data of 12 countries (Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, 
Sweden and UK) and the seven years available (1995 to 2001). Again, 
the three countries (Ireland, Luxemburg and Denmark) with no 
NUTS2 regional data are excluded. The measure of spatial income 
inequality (SPATIAL) is the log of the coefficient of variation of in-
come per capita at the NUTS2 level.  
The first column shows the regression of inequality on the coeffi-
cient of variation (SPATIAL) and the log of income per capita 
(INCPERCAP), as it can be argued that richer countries are less un-
equal than poorer ones. We add year dummies to control for purely 
cyclical effects and country dummies for any omitted variables which 
are country specific. Spatial inequality is indeed positively correlated 
with individual inequality. Income per capita has a negative impact on 
interpersonal income per capita only in (unreported) regressions when 
country dummies are not included. An important question is whether, 
once national transfers are taken into account, spatial inequality still 
affects individual income inequality. If, when we control for such 
transfers, spatial inequalities do no longer affect individual inequali-
ties, it can then be argued that national redistribution tools are suffi-
cient for cohesion. To test this, we add the log of per capita expendi-
ture on social transfers (SOCIAL), which we interpret as measuring 
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the country’s preference for redistribution. Note that these are meas-
ures of national redistribution and not of regional policies. The inter-
esting result is that introducing this crude measure of the national re-
distributive policy does not reduce the coefficient on spatial income 
inequality (SPATIAL). If anything, it increases the correlation be-
tween social and spatial inequalities. 
 In columns 3 and 4, we redo the exercise using a different meas-
ure of spatial inequality. Spatial inequality is now in terms of unem-
ployment using the Commission measure “Cohesion” which meas-
ures regional dispersion of unemployment rates for each country. In 
this case, this measure of spatial inequality is not significantly corre-
lated to income inequality. When, in column 5, we put both measures 
of spatial inequality into the regression, only the spatial inequality in 
incomes is significantly correlated with individual inequalities. The 
correlation is also quantitatively quite large. Given that the variables 
are in logs, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. 
Hence, a 10 per cent increase in spatial inequalities of incomes is as-
sociated with a 9.7 per cent increase in individual incomes, even after 
controlling for regional inequalities in unemployment, income per 
capita, social transfers, year and country fixed effects. 
This exercise should obviously be interpreted with caution, as 
many other determinants may affect individual income inequalities. 
The direction of causality is also not obvious. Clearly, spatial inequali-
ties could affect individual inequalities, but individual inequalities 
could also lead to spatial inequalities if agents (rich and poor) agglom-
erate in different regions. It suggests, however, that the link between 
regional and social inequalities indeed seems strong even when we 
control for year and country specific effects and that national redistri-
bution policies do not seem fully able to eliminate the impact of re-
gional income inequalities on social inequalities. 
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Table 2. Income inequality and spatial inequality  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SPATIAL .772 ** 
(.238) 
.805** 
(.234) 
  .972*** 
(.205) 
COHESION   .107 
(.110) 
.093 
(.139) 
-.039 
(.094) 
INCPERCAP .096 
(.170) 
-.020 
(.176) 
.134 
(.076) 
.190 
(.163) 
.036 
(.203) 
SOCIAL  .143 
(.176) 
 -.087 
(.299) 
-.076 
(.251) 
Year fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
81 71 81 71 71 
R squared 
(within) 
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 
Notes: (dependent variable: log of the ratio of the mean net income of the top decile 
to the bottom decile at the country level). 
Source: Eurostat/Region; ***, **, * significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per 
cent; standard errors in parenthesis. The constant and dummy coefficients are not 
reported. All variables are in log. 
 
4.3. Is there a spatial component to wage inequalities? 
An alternative way of analysing the relation between spatial and social 
inequalities is to look at the determinants of wage inequalities. If a 
large part of the wage inequalities between individuals is explained by 
geographical factors, then indeed regional policies that induce reloca-
tion of industries towards poor regions may help decrease individual 
inequalities, even though it may not be the most efficient way of do-
ing this. Work by Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) and Gobillon 
(2002), however, suggests that this is only partially the case. The first 
paper uses data on average regional earnings in the UK during the 
1982-1997 period. It shows a worsening of UK regional inequalities 
and a rise in the North-South gap. However, differences in education 
account for most of the aggregate divergence. London gained because 
its workforce became relatively more educated over the period. Sec-
ond, returns to education increased nation-wide, which favoured the 
most educated regions (i.e., London). Third, returns to education 
were initially lower in London but they (partially) caught up with the 
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rest of the country. Had returns to education and their distribution 
across UK regions remained stable over the period, the UK North-
South divide would have decreased.  
Gobillon (2002) uses individual French data on wages to quantify 
the determinants of local disparities in wages during the 1978-1990 
period. He finds that two thirds of the regional inequalities in wages 
are explained by the individual characteristics of the workers; in par-
ticular his or her level of education. Naturally, this leaves one third 
unexplained, but this is the maximum that could be accounted for by 
geographical factors.  
These two studies suggest that a major reason for the increase in 
regional inequalities inside European countries may not have any sig-
nificant relationship with geography of production per se. If returns 
to education have increased since the 1980s, which most labour 
economists believe, then the increase in regional inequality is at least 
partially a consequence of the increase in individual inequalities, itself 
caused by the increase in the return to education. A plausible story is 
that initially rich regions were well endowed with workers with high 
levels of education so that the increase in regional disparities in GDP 
per capita reflected the association of a general increase in the return 
to education and the initial geographical disparity in education levels. 
Furthermore, it is well known that better educated workers are more 
mobile, so that they may also have concentrated in the richer regions. 
4.4. Can regional policies increase social inequalities? 
The type of instrument used by regional policies also has important 
implications for the link between individual inequalities and regional 
inequalities. Most countries subsidize investment rather than em-
ployment at the regional level and this translates into subsidies to 
capital rather than labour (see Yuill et al., 1997; and Fuest and Huber, 
2000). An important example is the subsidy program provided to 
Eastern Germany. According to Fuest and Huber (2000), 90 per cent 
of the subsidies to firms locating in Eastern Germany take the form 
of investment subsidies. At the European level, more than 400 types 
of subsidies exist that can help firms in poor regions. They take so 
many forms that it seems quite safe to characterize them as a compli-
cated mix of subsidies to capital and labour.  
Regional policies consisting of subsidising industries so as to give 
them an incentive to relocate in disadvantaged regions may have per-
verse effects on individual inequalities. If capital is mobile, subsidising 
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the return on capital in one region amounts to increasing its return in 
all regions. The reason is that if the return to capital is higher in one 
region than in another, in the long term, relocation will take place un-
til the returns are equalised (see Dupont and Martin, 2003). Regional 
policies that subsidise capital in poor regions may actually imply trans-
fers from the poor to the rich region as the increase in the return to 
capital will benefit the region with the highest share of capital owner-
ship. Hence, even if they succeed in reducing regional inequalities, 
such subsidies to capital may end up increasing inequalities between 
individuals. This might be an extreme scenario, but it serves as a re-
minder that the choice of instruments used by regional subsidies is 
extremely important.  
To sum up, a large share of regional inequalities come from indi-
vidual inequalities, themselves produced by individual characteristics, 
in particular differences in the education level. This implies that re-
gional policies that offer subsidies to firms locating in poor regions or 
financing infrastructure projects in those regions may only have lim-
ited effects on regional inequalities and that policies concentrating on 
education may be more efficient. 
 5. Conclusions 
Public economic intervention must either be based on efficiency or 
on equity considerations. This paper has argued that the legitimacy of 
regional policies in Europe is not strong on either ground. A major 
rethink is required, based on simple principles in economics. On the 
efficiency motive, we have argued that increasing returns, which ex-
plain spatial economic concentration, also point to the efficiency gains 
of this process. Recent econometric evidence shows, in the European 
context, that these gains should be taken into account when defining 
regional policies. In the light of the recent enlargement, this is a cru-
cial tradeoff. On the equity motive, the evidence suggests that na-
tional redistribution schemes (income taxes, social transfers, etc) that 
are not spatially defined do reduce spatial inequalities (at least in the 
French example), but may not be sufficient instruments to reduce so-
cial inequalities.  
Regional policies in Europe do not take into account the fact that 
richer countries can more easily redistribute from rich to poor regions 
through national redistribution than poor countries. Even if it has the 
same GDP per capita as some regions in poorer countries, Corsica 
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benefits heavily from transfers from Ile de France, but this is not 
taken into account when designing European regional policies. Given 
the existence of these transfers at the national level, it is not obvious 
why European regional policies should focus on intranational regional 
inequalities. From this point of view, the recommendation of the 
Sapir report to renationalize regional policies to focus the impact of 
Structural Funds on inequalities between countries makes sense. The 
priority, especially after the enlargement, should be to speed up con-
vergence between countries in Europe. It might be argued that this is 
at odds with the finding that European integration has fostered con-
vergence between countries but not regions inside countries so that 
regional policies are not necessary for global convergence but for lo-
cal convergence. However, inequalities between countries are much 
larger than between regions inside countries and national redistribu-
tion policies are powerful instruments for reducing the latter. There-
fore, there is no real need for European regional policy to deal with 
intranational regional inequalities. 
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